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I 
 
Hannah Arendt is generally understood to have rejected direct involvement in politics, and 
refused to categorise her thinking in partisan terms. Yet this was not always the case. 
Arendt’s early work from the 1930s and 1940s was predominantly concerned with 
contemporary Jewish politics, and her response to the events of this period form the most 
directly political engagement of Arendt’s career. This article tracks the development of 
Arendt’s thought over this timeframe, and how key aspects of her political thought developed 
through her understanding of the “Jewish nation.” The evolution of this concept emerged 
through Arendt’s increasingly critical position on mainstream Zionism, and her alternative: a 
binational Palestine, drawing on the unconventional Zionism of Bernard Lazare. This model, 
Arendt believed, if implemented correctly, could serve as a template for political organisation 
globally. 
Arendt became interested in Jewish politics in the late 1920s. Despite writing 
extensively on this in the 1930s and 1940s, these writings attract less attention than her other 
work. Karuna Mantena writes, “Origins has come to hold a relatively subordinate place in the 
context of analyses and assessments of Arendt’s political philosophy as a whole.”1 What is 
true of The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt’s first major work, published in 1951, is 
considerably more so of the work preceding it. Furthermore, consensus is lacking on where 
the Jewish writings should be located in her overall political theory. After Origins Jewish 
themes no longer form Arendt’s central intellectual focus. This can be partly attributed to the 
changing political environment: the creation of Israel and her criticisms of that process. But 
while some claim a clear division exists between the substantive theory of the early and later 
                                                             
1 Karuna Mantena, “Genealogies of Catastrophe,” in Seyla Benhabib, ed., Politics in Dark Times: Encounters 
with Hannah Arendt (Cambridge, 2010), 83-112, at 84. 
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work, as well as the subject matter, others argue there is consistency. Richard King represents 
a strong example of the former, arguing before the “sharp divide” Arendt saw politics as 
instrumental, unlike her later understanding of political action as an intrinsic good.2 Gabriel 
Piterberg echoes this, claiming Arendt’s early writings, “form a virtually self-contained 
episode in her career.” 3 Judith Butler believes Arendt’s politics fundamentally shifts between 
the early and later period, in terms of her understanding of “nation.”4 Sheldon Wolin argues 
the Jewish writings, unlike Arendt’s later work, lacked conceptual clarity, particularly in 
defining the category of Jewishness. She separated “‘Jewishness’ qua brute ontological datum 
and ‘Judaism’ qua religion,” he writes. “What it is that remains of ‘Jewishness’ when one has 
jettisoned ‘Judaism’ was a matter she never addressed.”5   
However, others have emphasised the influence of Arendt’s Jewish writings on her 
later publications, often focusing on the connection between Origins and subsequent work. 
Margaret Canovan writes, “not only is The Human Condition itself much more closely related 
to The Origins of Totalitarianism than it appears to be, but virtually the entire agenda of 
Arendt’s political thought was set by her reflections on the political catastrophes of the 
twentieth century.”6 Bernard Crick goes further, describing Arendt’s later work as a “giant 
                                                             
2 Richard H. King, “Endings and Beginnings: Politics in Arendt's Early Thought,” Political Theory, 12/2 (1984), 
235. 
3 Gabriel Piterberg, “Zion’s Rebel Daughter,” New Left Review, 28 (November-December 2007), accessed 
December 6, 2013. http://newleftreview.org/II/48/gabriel-piterberg-zion-s-rebel-daughter  
4 Judith Butler, “I Merely Belong to Them,” London Review of Books, 29/9 (May 10, 2007), accessed December 
6, 2013. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n09/judith-butler/i-merely-belong-to-them   
5 Richard Wolin, “The Hannah Arendt Situation,” New England Review, 22/2 (2001), 102-3. 
6 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought, (Cambridge, 1992), 7.  
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footnote” to Origins.7 Seyla Benhabib has written extensively on the need to contextualise 
Arendt within her German-Jewish background, and claims Origins is the crowing political 
achievement of Arendt’s career.8 Similarly, Jerome Kohn argues parts of her work “cannot be 
fully grasped without recognising its poignancy as originating in Arendt’s experience as a 
Jew living in the twentieth century.”9 And Richard Bernstein notes that “a split between 
Arendt’s Jewish concerns and the rest of her work is untenable…her confrontation with the 
Jewish question…shaped many of the fundamental issues that preoccupied her throughout 
her life.”10 Yet he raises Wolin’s problem with Arendt’s category of “nation”, which, he 
argues, was never properly defined. “It seems as if Arendt simply takes the existence of the 
Jewish people as a historical fact…but this is to avoid the question of Jewish identity, not to 
answer it.”11  
This paper takes the position that there is a close intellectual connection between 
Arendt’s Jewish writings and her later theory, supporting those who have persuasively argued 
the relationship between Origins and later texts should be taken seriously, as should the 
formative experiences of Arendt’s earlier life. However, to fully understand this connection, 
it is necessary to also track Arendt’s thought prior to Origins, specifically her Zionism, more 
systematically than has been done before, to understand precisely the intellectual roots of her 
thought. Certainly, the European catastrophe was enormously important in shaping Origins, 
                                                             
7 Bernard Crick, “Arendt and The Origins of Totalitarianism: An Anglocentric View,” in Steven E. Aschheim, 
ed., Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, (Berkley, 2001), 93-104. 
8 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt, (Oxford, 2003).   
9 Jerome Kohn, “Preface,” in Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman, eds., The Jewish Writings (New York, 2007), 
ix-xxxi, at x.   
10 Richard Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question, (Cambridge, 1996), 9. 
11 Ibid., 27. 
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as Benhabib and Canovan stress. But Arendt’s response was conditioned by other influences, 
most importantly, I will argue, Arendt’s complex relationship with Zionism. It is possible, via 
this engagement, to go beyond the mere influence of Jewish identity, and identify the 
development of a substantive part of Arendt’s later thought. Specifically, the supposedly 
problematic notion of “Jewishness” takes on new clarity when understood in the context of 
Arendt’s Zionism. A notion of “the people,” differentiated from a “nation” emerges as an 
important conceptual development, in which a particular idea of politics inheres, influencing 
key components of Arendt’s later political thought. This is conceptually close to what 
Canovan has previously written about, but I claim that by tracing its origins in Arendt’s 
earliest writings and her engagement with Zionism (rather than Origins, as Canovan does) it 
is possible to see this idea both as a solution to the problem of distinguishing “Jewishness” 
within her Jewish writings, as well as understand the roots of this idea, and thus establish a 
connection between Arendt’s earliest and latest work.12  
Arendt’s writings on Jewish politics ended abruptly after 1951, largely due to her 
disillusionment with the new state of Israel. But in the period immediately prior Arendt had 
been at her most politically active. Her lengthy correspondence in 1948 with Jewish leader 
Judah Magnes on the Israeli state, reveals the shape of Arendt’s political theory in practice: 
federalism. Arendt is “one of the great outsiders of twentieth-century political thought,” it has 
been claimed, remaining “aloof to all group sympathies or affiliations.”13 But Arendt’s 
support of a binational Israeli-Palestinian state adds another important dimension to her work, 
with Arendt expressing strong (although shifting) partisanship in terms of Zionist politics 
                                                             
12 Canovan, “The People, the Masses, and the Mobilization of Power,” Social Research, 69/2 (2002). 
13 Canovan, Reinterpretation, 1; Dagmar Barnouw, Visible Spaces: Hannah Arendt and the German-Jewish 
experience (Baltimore, 1990), ix. 
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over the 1930s and 1940s. The binational Palestinian state is a rare example of Arendt 
working towards a particular political actuality.   
Thus her early work involved not just critique but a form of activism. The federal 
model she outlined flows from her positive conception of a people, contrasted against 
nationalistic notions. The model encompassed institutional structures ranging from the local 
to the national and regional levels. By 1948, this formed a political framework that Arendt 
did not see as exclusively Jewish, but applicable to all peoples. The idea of a people and its 
position within a federal structure thus offers an understanding of the political in Arendt’s 
early work that not only illustrates her thought during this period, but is perhaps the most 
concrete political conceptualisation Arendt ever drew. This paper will trace her engagement 
with Zionism, to clarify both the source of her idea of “the Jewish people,” and the 
connections that can be drawn between this and her later work, using the example of her 1963 
text, On Revolution. 
 
II 
 
Before the rise of National Socialism, Arendt had taken little interest in politics, instead 
focusing on philosophy. Raised in a liberal, assimilated Jewish family, her Jewishness had 
been of relatively little consequence to her personal or intellectual life. She studied first at 
Marburg with Heidegger, already renowned as an extraordinary intellect even before his first 
publication.14 She then worked on her doctorate at Heidelberg with existentialist philosopher 
Karl Jaspers, with whom she developed a lifelong friendship. Eventually, rising 
antisemititism played a decisive influence, leading to Arendt fleeing Germany for France in 
                                                             
14 His first academic publication was his 1927 masterpiece, Sein und Zeit. 
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1933, following her brief imprisonment by the Nazis.15 Amidst this changing environment, 
two particular events influenced Arendt’s thought on Jewish politics: her discovery of 
Bernard Lazare’s writings; and her friendship with the head of the German Zionist 
Organization, Kurt Blumenfeld. Lazare’s socialist, collectivist Zionism contrasted with the 
dominant Zionism of Arendt’s Germany (represented by Blumenfeld), heavily influenced by 
Zionist “founding father” Theodor Herzl, who emphasised the reconstruction of the Jewish 
homeland in Palestine. Lazare expressed more revolutionary ideals, espousing, through his 
Zionism, a break with the notion of sovereignty Herzl saw as foundational. Lazare, Arendt 
later wrote, was the last representative of Zionism who “trusted the Jewish people for the 
necessary political strength of will to achieve freedom, instead of being transported to 
freedom.”16 This portrait of Lazare, whilst idealised, nevertheless illustrates her preference 
for Lazare’s form of Zionism, interpreted as a philosophy rejecting traditional rule-based 
politics, and in which leadership was replaced by the constituent power of the people. Yet she 
supported Blumenfeld, despite the German Zionist Organization’s very different 
understanding of Zionism. Arendt’s interest in Zionism, while profoundly important to her, 
was thus never simple, and she maintained a critical distance. 
However, Arendt believed Zionism had powerful and compelling aspects, and this 
sympathy emerged in her biography of the Jewess Rahel Varnhagen, the Jewish eighteenth 
century Berlin salonnière. Varnhagen’s letters document her lifelong struggle with her 
Jewishness: outwardly, in the social sphere, and inwardly, through her personal identity. 
While Arendt never sought to assimilate as Varnhagen did, she clearly identified with her and 
the turbulent socio-political status of Jews in Varnhagen’s world. Largely written in the late 
1920s and early 1930s, Rahel Varnhagen is a response to the contemporary political crisis: a 
                                                             
15 Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (London, 2004), 105-106. 
16 Arendt, “Zionism Reconsidered,” in Jewish Writings, 343-74, at 363-4. 
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meditation on what it means to be Jewish in modernity, and a condemnation of Jewish 
assimilation.  
Jewishness cannot be an objective characteristic, Arendt argues, defining it as “not an 
objectification of Jewish existence…but the historical conditions of a life which can, I think, 
mean something.”17 The idea one ought to understand a people through their historical 
conditions, rather than inwardly shared characteristics, is central to Arendt’s method of 
understanding Jewish political identity. “The history of any given personality is far older than 
the individual as a product of nature,” Arendt claims, “begins long before the individual’s 
life, and can foster or destroy the elements of nature in his heritage.”18 For Arendt, 
individuals are born into a story predating them, are bound to a common past, but in a way 
that the individual may freely continue that story through their actions.  
Yet Varnhagen’s Enlightenment world inverted the relationship between history and 
individual, Arendt believed. Universal reason, not historical contingency, was understood as 
the essence of the individual, and of community. So Enlightenment ideas accelerated social 
atomisation, already initiated by secularisation, and thus the breakdown of Jewish identity.19 
Superficially, it seemed Jews would benefit from Enlightenment tolerance, Arendt wrote. 
This was not the case. Enlightenment thought preached equality for individuals, not peoples. 
Only assimilated Jews could be equals; equality entailed the rejection of Jewish identity. In 
Arendt’s terms, this places Jews in an impossible position. “The possibilities of being 
different from what one is are infinite. Once one has negated oneself, however, there are no 
longer any particular choices. There is only one aim: always, at any given moment, to be 
                                                             
17 Arendt, “Letter to Karl Jaspers, 24 March 1930,” in Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner, eds., Hannah Arendt, Karl 
Jaspers: Correspondence, 1926-1969 (London, 1992), 11. 
18 Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston (New York, 1974), 4. 
19 Arendt, “The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question,” in Jewish Writings, 3-18, at 14-15.  
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different from what one is…to become anything else, so long as it is not oneself.”20 And, she 
points out, assimilated Jews could not escape prejudice. Even having cast off their 
Jewishness, they were seen to belong to an alien people. Unopposed, antisemitic narratives 
became increasingly accepted even amongst assimilated Jews. “The individual who has been 
liberated by reason is always running head-on into a world…where past in the shape of 
‘prejudices’ has a great deal of power; he is forced to learn that past reality is also a reality,” 
Arendt wrote.21 The combination of antisemitism, the rejection of cultural-historical 
difference by assimilated Jews in favour of universal rationality, and the principle of self-
negation, was toxic.  Assimilated Jews were doubly undermined, by rootlessness within, and 
prejudice without. Because Varnhagen rejected her past by assimilating, Arendt wrote, she 
“was completely at the mercy of the destructive elements.”22  
 
III 
 
Over the 1930s, the ideas in Rahel became increasingly politicised as Arendt highlighted the 
centrality of the political sphere for resolving the Jews’ problems. Failed assimilation and the 
impending disaster of extreme nationalism led Arendt to seek an alternative concept of the 
political. In Paris, surrounded by other Jewish refugees at work (Arendt worked for Jewish 
refugee agency Youth Aliyah) and at home, Jewish issues dominated Arendt’s thought. Two 
unpublished essays from the late 1930s applied some of the ideas from Rahel to the 
contemporary crisis. In the context of widespread nationalist prejudice against minorities, 
assimilationism was a blindness of the Jews towards extreme danger, Arendt believed. “The 
                                                             
20 Arendt, Rahel, 13. 
21 Ibid., 10. 
22 Ibid., 113. 
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refusal to analyze or deal with or indeed to confront antisemitism was tantamount to a 
political refusal to offer any defense whatever,” she wrote. “But there is no question that in 
politics knowing your enemy is at least as important as knowing yourself.”23 Yet, she argues, 
the Jews failed to grasp that any political solution must consider the position of the Jewish 
nation within the wider world. Assimilation had come up against its own negation in National 
Socialism: the idea of Jewishness as natural substance. Attacked as Jews, Arendt argued, 
Jews must battle their enemies as Jews. Jewish politics must look inward and outward, 
reaffirming national identity whilst understanding their position in the world. The breakdown 
of assimilation offered the potential – and necessity – for Jews to affirm their political 
identity. Yet this potential, Arendt wrote, while “granted by the grace of the Nazis, first had 
to be confirmed and constituted by ourselves.”24  
In Antisemitism, her first substantial essay on Zionism, Arendt assesses the potential 
of Zionism in this task. As the only extant political answer to Jewish persecution she supports 
Zionism, but is critical of it as a movement. Zionism is “the legitimate heir to assimilation,”25 
but its focus on Palestine, not the diaspora, means fails to deal with the imminent threat to 
Jewish existence. While correctly rejecting assimilation, Zionism erred in adopting certain 
nationalist assumptions, inspired, Arendt believed, by Herzl, for whom, “the ultimate goal of 
Jewish politics is the normalisation of the conditions for the Jewish substance.”26 This was 
fundamentally dangerous. “For Zionism – as for nationalist historiography – status as a 
‘nation of foreigners’ is just as undifferentiated as 100 percent correspondence is for the 
assimilationists…Zionism…soars to heights of counter-assertions that are just as purely 
                                                             
23 Arendt, “The Jewish Question,” in Jewish Writings, 42-5, at 43. 
24 Ibid., 43-4. 
25 Arendt, “Antisemitism,” in Jewish Writings, 56. 
26 Ibid., 54. 
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dogmatic.”27 In claiming “Jewish substance,” and, implicitly, the natural superiority of the 
Jewish nation, Zionist ideology rejects the only possible basis of Jewishness, that found in a 
shared past. Instead, the principle of foreignness becomes the organising factor: “a blindness 
for any differentiation between friend and foe.”28 Zionism, like other nationalist-tinged 
ideologies, replaces history with the negative principle of enmity. Herzl’s “victorious trend” 
of Zionism, as Arendt called it, thus had serious deficiencies.29   
Throughout the 1930s, Arendt developed two interconnected critiques of assimilation 
and nationalistic Zionism. In doing so, she developed her concept of a people. Against 
assimilationists, she argued a people must share an identity based upon understanding their 
shared history. In short, as Canovan argues Arendt suggests in Origins, the difference 
between a people and a non-people, is that the former must share a self-created, public 
“world.”30 Yet they must also claim equality; demand to be treated with equal dignity to other 
peoples and do likewise. Both aspects stand against nationalist ideas of the “natural” nation 
and international hierarchisation. Arendt depicts a people as a weak constellation premised 
upon inner recognition of unity, and mutual recognition by other peoples. It rests upon 
historical contingency and so appears fragile and uncontrollable. However, one thing offered 
Arendt hope. Extreme antisemitism, and the impossibility of assimilation, meant “the history 
of the Jewish people is again becoming unified.”31 The idea of a Jewish people, rejected by 
Enlightenment ideology, was thrust back into politics. Arendt saw an opportunity for world 
Jewry to re-emerge as a people.   
                                                             
27 Ibid., 50-1. 
28 Ibid., 56. 
29 Arendt, “Peace or Armistice in the Near East,” in Jewish Writings, 423-50, at 442. 
30 Canovan, “The People,” 414. 
31 Arendt, “Antisemitism,” 61. 
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IV 
 
In 1941, Arendt fled occupied France for America. There, she took up the question of the 
future of the Jewish people with zeal. Arendt was soon invited to write for German-Jewish 
newspaper Aufbau, an influential émigré publication which proved an ideal forum for Arendt. 
Although a German language paper, Aufbau aimed to help émigrés to “Americanise”: 
integrate into the society of the United States. In 1941, against the background of American 
unease with the sudden influx of German immigrants – albeit persecuted Germans – the 
paper’s key message was to encourage its readers to visibly support the war effort. 32 Readers 
were encouraged to donate money, goods and time, whilst Aufbau itself made a particular 
point of its patriotism through its articles. In the early 1940s, Aufbau’s editorial policy on 
Zionism and Palestine was unsettled, mirroring Arendt’s ambiguous attitude. This would 
change markedly by 1945, as political momentum moved in favour of Zionism in America 
and Europe, and Arendt became increasingly critical of the movement.  
Arendt wrote for Aufbau from 1941 to 1945, often writing on the idea that marks out 
this period of her work: her support for the creation of a Jewish army to fight in the war. The 
proposal was spearheaded in America by Irgun, the Revisionist Zionist party ideologically 
influenced by militant nationalist Ze’ev Jabotinsky, and in Britain by the moderate Chaim 
Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization. But Arendt was in unlikely 
company. She considered Irgun to be little more than a terrorist organisation, and 
Weizmann’s programme, whilst less repellent to Arendt, was considered to be contrary to the 
dignity of what should be a self-determining people, relying heavily on the British for 
                                                             
32 “Aufbau,” Transatlantic Perspectives, accessed May 5, 2014. 
http://www.transatlanticperspectives.org/entry.php?rec=90  
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support. Ultimately, little would come out of these calls for a Jewish army – only in 1945 was 
a Jewish Brigade, formed of Palestinian Jews, established within the British Army, a “token 
success” making little impact.33  
Arendt’s support of the Jewish Army embodies a movement in her work towards a 
more practical engagement with politics. However her conceptual division between the 
nationalised “nation” and a “people” remained at the heart of her argument for the Jewish 
army, which was concerned with how to reconstitute Jewish identity against antisemitism. 
Over this period, Arendt repeatedly refers to the need to revitalise the “Jewish nation,” but 
this in no way implied the acceptance of nationalism.34 The fact was, she argued, “you can 
only defend yourself as the person you are attacked as.”35 Arendt’s argument does not rely 
upon intrinsic national substance but is concerned with the essential interdependency of 
peoples. The Jewish army is primarily a method of developing a robust Jewish self-
understanding of their existence as a people – Arendt’s alternative to both nation-building 
through nationalist narratives, and assimilationist apathy; her attempt to find a different path 
for Jewish politics. 
 
We can do battle against antisemitism only if we battle Hitler with weapons in our 
hands. But this battle must in turn be waged on the basis of certain theoretical insights 
whose consequences we wish to make a reality. The first of these insights is that we 
enter this war as a European people, who have contributed as much to the glory and 
                                                             
33 “Britain Creating a Jewish Brigade,” New York Times, 20 September 1944, 12. 
34 Arendt, “The Jewish War That Isn’t Happening,” in Jewish Writings, 134-85, at 137. 
35 Ibid., 137. 
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misery of Europe …we must do battle with all those in our own ranks who claim that 
we are and always have been nothing but the victims and targets of history.36 
 
Furthermore, the breakdown of Western politics, Arendt argues, created conditions 
where the renewal of Jewish nationality might be realised through a newly shared political 
position. In the political void, the “no longer and not yet,” was the opportunity not only for 
Jews to reconstitute themselves upon firm ground, but for all peoples.37  “The chances are 
now very great for a new orientation of Jewish national politics,” she wrote. “We can expect 
more from this solidarity [with other European peoples] than from any protections granted us 
in the past.”38 Jews were the first victims of modernity, but not its last, as expanding 
nationalisms meant, Arendt wrote, that where once the Jewish people alone were seen to be 
outsiders, or “pariahs,” now “all European nations have become pariah peoples, all are forced 
to take up the battle anew for freedom and equality. For the first time our fate has turned out 
to be no special fate.”39 That the Jewish people are no longer alone in their persecution, 
represents a radical change in the political sphere, and new possibilities for mutual 
recognition and shared action. By claiming that Jews have been brought together with other 
peoples through similar struggles, Arendt’s political theory, which previously applied solely 
to the Jewish people, becomes applicable to all peoples. Thus Arendt’s Jewish political 
thought transforms into political thought as such, forming the basis from which aspects of her 
later political thought developed. 
                                                             
36 Ibid., 143. 
37 Arendt, “No Longer and Not Yet,” in Jerome Kohn, ed., Essays in Understanding (New York, 1994), 158-62, 
at 158. 
38 Arendt, “A Way Towards the Reconciliation of Peoples,” in Jewish Writings, 258-63, at 261. 
39 Arendt, “The Jewish War,” 141. 
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However, the broadening out of Arendt’s political theory does not mean her interest in 
Jewish politics was diminished. Arendt was at her most actively Zionist in this period, amidst 
the turmoil of war, and in response to what she sees as the urgent need for the Jewish 
community to unite against oppression. “We have only one truly political organization,” she 
argues, “the Zionist organization.”40 Yet even now, she is critical of its direction, whilst 
recognising it as the only practical basis for a Jewish movement. Her notion of the Jewish 
army is itself a critique of Zionism. “Zionist propaganda must finally put itself on solid 
footing instead of standing on ground our enemies prepare for us,”41 she claims. This solid 
footing is not in Palestine, but in “the determination of its people to be free.”42 Zionism is 
hindered by its failure to include the whole Jewish people. “Until a real popular movement 
arises out of our various committees and political bodies, we do not stand a chance.”43 
Zionism undermines itself, Arendt believes, by making nationalist assumptions, adopted in 
extreme form by Irgun. Their argument for the Jewish army was based on fascist, nationalist 
principles, Arendt argues, and she declares herself opposed to their growing influence on 
Zionist doctrine. However, she believes their views are not without ideological precedent in 
Zionism. 
Late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Zionism possessed remarkable diversity, 
incorporating religious, political (often secular), and cultural strands; expressed divergent 
opinions on Palestine; and covered various positions from left to right. As a secular Jew, 
Arendt remained distant from the religious elements of Zionism. She also rejected those 
elements she deemed “nationalistic,” predominantly those now falling under the classification 
                                                             
40 Arendt, “The Jewish War,” 143-144. 
41 Ibid., 182. 
42 Ibid., 182. 
43 Ibid., 181. 
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of political Zionism – for Arendt, an ironic label, for it was precisely these who sought to 
avoid politics, she thought, rather than engaging with the political reality of one’s enemies.44 
The growing dominance of this group, including Leon Pinsker and Herzl among others, 
eventually resulted in the diminishment of Zionism’s ideological breadth. But it is Herzl who 
is singled out by Arendt as the key influence. 
Herzl, a Hungarian-born Jewish journalist, was the first populariser of Zionism on a 
large scale, as a feasible political aim. This was achieved through his writing – notably his 
1896 Der Judenstaat – and political activism, founding and heading the first Zionist group 
with serious political ambitions: the World Zionist Organisation. Through this, Herzl built 
Zionism from a small and fragmented movement into a global political force united behind 
clear aims. Central to Herzl’s philosophy was the principle that Jews were a nation like any 
other, and therefore needed a homeland to escape European antisemitism. While Herzl 
concluded that should be Palestine, his political ideology was secular, not religious. He 
believed Palestine should be restored to the Jews because of the historical link, that is, the 
sense of connection Jewish people felt towards the region. Herzl combined the principles of 
the nation-state with a secularised Jewish history, to produce, in essence, Zionism as it 
became widely understood.    
Lazare was a French contemporary of Herzl, also a journalist, who became interested 
in Zionism, and the problem of antisemitism, through his involvement with the Dreyfus 
Affair (he was asked to defend Dreyfus). Lazare initially befriended Herzl, but the two soon 
fell out over the substantial differences in their respective Zionist projects. While Herzl 
sought a Jewish nation and territory modelled upon Western nations, Lazare, Arendt wrote, 
sought “not an escape from antisemitism but a mobilization of the people against its foes.”45 
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Lazare thus fits within a tradition generally known as cultural Zionism, including thinkers 
such as Martin Buber and Ahad Ha’am. Indeed, Arendt praised both Ha’am and Buber, 
calling Buber “German Judaism’s incontestable guide…[who] has always known how to 
infuse Zionism with a distinctive spirit.”46 Ha’am, she wrote, had done the same for Eastern 
Jews.47 But while Ha’am and Buber focused on Jewish spirit, Lazare took a more political 
approach. The importance of Lazare to Arendt is evident in her appraisal of his thought, as 
well as the extent of her work on him (she mentions him frequently, and in 1948 edited his 
previously unpublished manuscript, Job’s Dungheap.) Accordingly, Arendt drew extensively 
on his work.  
Herzl and Lazare shared a secular approach to Zionism, and the belief that the Jewish 
community and self-consciousness needed restoration. But Lazare rejected Herzl’s promotion 
of national Jewish politics, instead arguing that the demoralisation of the Jewish people was 
the primary obstacle to overcome.48 For Arendt too, there were numerous problems with 
Herzl. She criticised the importance Herzl placed upon the possession of sovereign territory, 
and rejected his belief that Jews could escape from antisemitism in this way. Such an escape, 
Arendt believed, had never been possible, let alone in a globalised world. Yet, she wrote, this 
was what modern Zionism, because of Herzl, preached. And Arendt rejects the foundation of 
Herzl’s philosophy: the nation state. The notion, she believed, not only fostered exclusion and 
violence, but was outdated, a remnant of the past that could not – and should not – persist. 
Yet while Arendt praised Lazare by contrast, she did not wholly adopt his philosophy. 
Lazare, although not an orthodox Marxist, adhered to socialist notions of the progress of 
mankind through revolution, and therefore believed antisemitism would “ultimately 
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perish…because antisemitism is one of the last, though most long lived, manifestations of 
that old spirit of reaction and narrow conservatism, which is vainly attempting to arrest the 
onward movement of the Revolution.”49 Arendt, living in different times, could not agree. 
However, there are remarkable similarities in their analyses of antisemitism and the position 
of Jews in modernity, particularly in Lazare’s 1894 Antisemitism: Its History and Causes, 
which Arendt had read. Lazare writes, “the day when the Jew was first admitted to civil 
rights, the Christian state was in danger…the antisemites who say that the Jews have 
destroyed the idea of State could more justly say that the entrance of the Jew into society 
marked the destruction of the State, meaning by State, the Christian State.”50 Arendt’s claim, 
in Origins, that enhanced Jewish civil rights resulted in social persecution, echoes this. 
Likewise, Lazare’s history of a divided people, the wealthy financiers and the impoverished 
masses, is central to Arendt’s narrative of Jewish history in Origins and more broadly. While 
for Lazare, this maps onto a capitalist/proletariat structure absent in Arendt’s work, the 
substance is nonetheless the same.  
It is in the notion of a Jewish people where the closest parallels exist between Arendt 
and Lazare’s thought. Arendt’s rejection of nationalistic determinism is evident in Lazare, 
who writes: 
 
There are no races, but there are peoples and nations. What is improperly called a race 
is not an ethnologic unit, but is an historic, intellectual and moral unit. The Jews are 
not an ethnos, but they are a nationality, they are diversified types, it is true, but what 
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nation is not diversified? What makes a people is not unity of origin, but unity of 
sentiments, ideas, ethics.51  
 
Like Arendt, Lazare rejects assimilation, writing: “What shocks me on the part of anti-
Semites is not hearing them say: “You are a Nation,” nor hearing them affirm that we are a 
state within the state. I find that there are not enough states within the state, or, to be more 
precise, in modern states there are not enough autonomous and free groupings with ties 
among themselves.”52 Lazare insisted the Jewish nation did not rely upon religion, race or 
language. What mattered, rather, was the shared consciousness of Jewish tradition and 
community.  
To be a Jew, or indeed a member of any people, was to be balanced between unity 
and difference. Hence for Lazare, like Arendt, the primary need for Jews was not territory, it 
was the restoration of a sense of public selfhood. Thus, Arendt writes, “Herzl’s solution of 
the Jewish problem was, in the final analysis, escape or deliverance in a homeland…To 
Lazare, on the other hand, the territorial question was secondary – a mere outcome of the 
primary demand that ‘the Jews should be emancipated as a people and in the form of a 
nation.’”53 The Jewish army was seen by Arendt as a catalyst for the Jewish people to 
rediscover itself, thereby forming a new political entity based upon a shared public identity – 
but only if it fought not only its enemies, but the whole ideology of antisemitism and its 
progenitor, nationalism. To the degree that Zionism embodied nationalism, Arendt rejected it. 
What she valued was the alternative, anti-nationalist Zionism Lazare offered.    
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V 
 
If nationalism was to be overcome, however, it must be replaced by an alternative system. A 
Jewish army might generate solidarity, but was not an enduring solution. That, she believed, 
in accordance with the mutual recognition central to her political understanding, could only 
emerge through federation. “Palestine can be saved as the national homeland of Jews,” she 
argues, “only if (like other small countries and nationalities), it is integrated into a 
federation.” Federation offers “the greatest chance of solving national conflicts and can thus 
be the basis for a political life that offers peoples the possibility of reorganizing themselves 
politically.”54 One might speculate American federalism influenced Arendt’s thinking, given 
her later fascination with American politics.55 But there are again parallels with Lazare’s 
thought, specifically his internationalism. “I find that in order to establish internationalism,” 
he writes, “it is necessary in the first place for human groups to conquer their autonomy. 
They must be able to freely express themselves; they must be conscious of who they are.”56 
But as well as conquering their autonomy, they also need to consider their position within the 
community of nations.  Lazare complains of the historical “exclusiveness” of the Jewish 
people, their self-imposed segregation. He rejects the “egoism of nations” in favour of an 
internationalism, “abolishing the current economic-political constitution of 
nations…Suppressing frontiers does not mean making an amalgamation of all the inhabitants 
of the globe. Is not one of the familiar concepts of internationalist socialism, and even of 
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revolutionary anarchism, the federative concept, the concept of a fragmented humanity 
composed of a multitude of cellular organisms?”57  
From Arendt’s global perspective on Jewish politics the creation of a new Jewish state 
hardly seemed an adequate solution. For Arendt, the diaspora mattered, and Zionism made 
the crucial error of ignoring it. The Jewish problem demanded more than a national solution – 
federalism was that solution. However, federalism for Arendt, like the problems it was 
intended to resolve, was by now about more than Jewish politics. The need to think about 
politics in terms of the cooperation and quasi-integration of different peoples, rather than in 
terms of sovereign exclusivity, clearly emerged from her engagement with Jewish politics, 
but for Arendt, increasing globalisation and a corresponding breakdown of sovereignty as an 
efficient political principle, meant federalisation was now seen as the future for all Western 
peoples. Arendt’s interest in politics had been provoked by the Jewish situation, but by the 
mid-1940s, Arendt was thinking about politics in broader terms. The Jewish crisis was still 
central, but now it was seen as the archetypal crisis of politics as a Western phenomenon.  
 
VI 
 
The clearest formation of Arendt’s federalism appears in her 1948 correspondence with Judah 
Leon Magnes, Jewish-American rabbi and political leader, and champion of Jewish-Arab 
federation. Yet in 1943, Arendt criticised Magnes’ binationalism. The problem, she argued, is 
Magnes thinks national conflicts may be resolved through the guarantee of minority rights, 
yet minority rights are an offshoot of nationalism, attributing unequal political status to 
peoples.58 As such, Magnes’ concept, “kills the idea that federation is – in contrast to a nation 
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– made up of different peoples with equal rights.”59 While she considered Zionism to be 
flawed, Arendt believed that it alone possessed a concept of the Jews as a distinctly political 
people. In fact, Arendt argues: “The Magnes proposal if realized would make out of Palestine 
one of our worst Galuth countries.”60 Yet shortly after, Arendt wholly reversed her judgment, 
becoming one of Magnes’ most devoted allies.  
Gil Rubin’s recent article discusses this remarkable change of opinion.61 Rubin 
positions Arendt within the context of broader debates occurring globally on federalism, 
including the possibility of European, as well as Arab, federation. He argues in the early 
1940s Arendt positioned herself against Magnes because she supported a specific notion of 
multi-ethnic federal structures, as opposed to those maintaining the damaging “minority-
majority” distinction.62 He claims that her later adoption of Magnes’ binationalism represents 
a shift in her political thinking, brought about by the changing political context. Clearly, the 
political context is important. Yet Arendt’s position on Magnes’ federalism also, crucially, 
results from her shifting opinion of the Zionist movement, rather than a substantive change in 
her underlying beliefs.  
By 1944, the basis of Arendt’s theoretical framework for understanding modern 
European politics had been formed, arising from her dual critique of assimilation and 
nationalism. Total insularity and total immersion into another culture were the two reasons 
for the failure of Jewish politics, and the former, as nationalism, was the great problem of 
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European politics. Arendt’s politics required both shared internal recognition, and an 
external, international dimension of recognition.  
During 1944 Arendt’s opinion of Zionism deteriorated dramatically. Aufbau, along 
with the American establishment in general, became increasingly supportive of the creation 
of a Jewish state, in the wake of the Holocaust, and the urgent question of what to do with 
Europe’s displaced people. But Arendt, in provocative contrast to the tide of opinion, now 
deplored Zionism as “nothing other than the uncritical acceptance of German-inspired 
nationalism,” from a time “when nobody could imagine any other solution of minority or 
nationality problems than the autonomous national state with a homogenous population.” 63     
What had brought about this decisive shift? The conceptual underpinnings were laid 
over twenty years, in Arendt’s criticism of Zionist nationalism and support of federalisation. 
But in 1944, a substantial movement in Zionist policy forced Arendt to choose between her 
political allegiances or her political theory. That year, at the American Zionist Organization’s 
Atlantic City meeting, the Revisionists Arendt so despised dominated conference 
proceedings. This was not unexpected, previous conferences had seen their nationalist agenda 
for Israel move into the mainstream, notably at the 1942 Biltmore Conference, which had 
prompted Magnes’ split with the Zionist Organization. But 1944 saw Irgun’s position gain 
massive support in response to an increasing awareness of the situation of European Jews. 
Their uncompromising demands for the creation of an Israel encompassing the full extent of 
its ancient territories were thus adopted by the influential American Zionist Organization.  
Zionism, Arendt now asserts, “started half a century ago with ideals so lofty that it 
overlooked the particular realities of the Near East and the general wickedness of the 
world.”64 As a result, it “has ended – as do most such movements – with the unequivocal 
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support not only of nationalist but of chauvinist claims – not against the foes of the Jewish 
people but against its possible friends and present neighbours.”65 The Atlantic City 
Resolution saw Zionism shift away from the social-revolutionary, popular ideals Arendt 
admired, towards the nationalist, militarist tendencies she had consistently abhorred. With 
this, the seriousness of the conflict between Palestinian Arabs and Jews crystallized in 
Arendt’s thought as the Arab position in relation to the proposed Zionist state took on a 
worryingly familiar aspect. Arendt believed that Arab Palestinians were, like the Jews, a 
people – and shortly would be a stateless people, if the Zionist programme succeeded. Arendt 
could not accept this, ethically or pragmatically. Most likely, she believed, Arabs would fight 
back, placing Israel in a precarious position within an already hostile region. “A Jewish 
national home that is not recognized and respected by its neighbouring people is no home but 
an illusion – until it becomes a battlefield.”66 So she turned from mainstream Zionism, whose 
errors she now saw as insurmountable, towards the binational politics of Magnes and his 
party, Ihud: “Unity.”  
 
VII 
 
Magnes, although born in America in 1877, was educated in part in Germany, where he 
discovered Zionism. Upon his return to America Magnes pursued his political aims, helping 
found the American Jewish Committee in 1906, and fundraising for Jews in Palestine. In 
1922, Magnes became one of the few American Jews to move to Mandate Palestine, and 
became involved with the Brit Shalom pacifist movement, proclaiming his support for a 
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binational solution in Palestine, with Jewish-Arab equality.67 In 1942, following his split with 
the Zionist Organization, he founded Ihud, a party promoting the principles of binationalism 
in Palestine – a deeply unpopular idea amongst both peoples of the region – and rejecting 
both a partitioned or wholly Jewish state.  
In 1948, in the wake of the UN decision that Israel should become an independent 
state, Arendt and Magnes began to correspond frequently on the question of Israel. This 
exchange represents Arendt’s most complete political programme to this date, in which her 
political theory is given particular form as a solution to the problems of the Arab-Jewish 
conflict. Through their correspondence Arendt advises Magnes, offering suggestions on Ihud 
policy, helps to promote Ihud through her writing, and makes connections with her own 
circle. Largely, Ihud’s policy corresponds to Arendt’s own politics, both sharing a belief in a 
binational Palestinian solution. Underlying this is a rejection of nationalism as a political 
principle, and, in particular, a rejection of the Zionist movement towards Israeli nationalism, 
such as the right wing ideology of Menachem Begin, incorporating “ultranationalism, 
religious mysticism and racial superiority.”68 Instead, Arab Palestinians must be recognised 
as an equal people, and this recognition institutionalised within the Jewish-Palestinian 
constitutional structure. This was essential, Arendt believed, if Israel had any realistic chance 
of survival. “The idea of Arab-Jewish cooperation, though never realized on any scale and 
today seemingly further off than ever, is not an idealistic daydream, but a sober statement of 
the fact that without it the whole Jewish venture in Palestine is doomed.”69 The precise form 
was described in Ihud’s 1948 proposal to the UN, recommending equal representation of 
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Arabs and Jews in shared Palestinian political institutions.70 This ought not to be a 
majoritarian democracy but, instead, represent the political equality of peoples. Majoritarian 
democracy, Ihud claims, has never functioned in a state with multiple peoples.  
Palestinian binationalism springs from Arendt’s critique of assimilationist and 
nationalist politics, and her commitment to the formal political equality of peoples as a basis 
for the equality of individuals. Compared to partition, she argues, it is “much more realistic 
… [because] it avoids the troublesome majority-minority constellation, which is insoluble by 
definition.”71 It is the nationalist logic of the separation of peoples in a partitioned state that 
she opposes, an ideology doomed to produce conflict through the assumption of inequality. 
Arendt also believes the organisational structure of a binational state would prove more 
amenable to conflict resolution. An internally federated structure would rest upon Jewish-
Arab community councils, she claims, “which would mean that the Jewish-Arab conflict 
would be resolved on the lowest and most promising level of proximity and 
neighbourliness.”72 Her model here is the kibbutz, which she semi-mythologised as “the most 
magnificent part of the Jewish homeland.”73 Arendt had worked for Jewish agency Youth 
Aliyah in 1930s Paris, an organisation that trained young Jewish refugees for life in the 
kibbutzim, and arranged their migration to Palestine. As part of this work, Arendt visited 
Palestine, and apparently became captivated with the kibbutzim as an expression of genuine 
community. This idea would stay with her, feeding an ideal of what Palestine could be 
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(despite the fact that these Jewish communities neither integrated nor sought to integrate with 
local Arab populations).74 
The second aspect of this proposal was federation between a binational Palestine and 
its neighbours. “A federated state, finally, could be the natural stepping-stone for any later, 
greater federated structure in the Near East and the Mediterranean area,”75 Arendt wrote. 
More immediately, informal cooperation – inspired by friendly federation within Palestine – 
could provide essential regional stability. “For good relationships with the Arab states, an 
Arab ‘minority’ can as well be an asset as it could become a liability,” Arendt wrote. “It 
would be an asset if complete equality were granted, including complete equality of the Arab 
language with the Hebrew language and if the very term ‘minority’ were carefully 
avoided.”76 This corresponds to Arendt’s belief that the age of the nation-state as the 
dominant political actor was ending, not only here, but across the Western world. The 
Zionists, she asserts, made the mistake of asking for a state, “only when the whole concept of 
national sovereignty had become a mockery.”77 
Thus, the earlier “federalist” and later “binationalist” positions that Rubin identifies, 
are not substantially different. In both her earlier critical position on Magnes, and her later 
endorsement of his binationalism, Arendt rejects any form of political organisation that 
perpetuates the “majority-minority” problem. Therefore, in both, she argues any Palestinian-
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Israeli organisational form should be part of a wider political federation of peoples. In her 
later correspondence, she is simply more practically-minded, as one would expect in the 
circumstances of direct political engagement. Arendt sets out, through her correspondence, 
the steps to a federal structure, believing Palestinian-Israeli binationalism could form the first 
step to regional federation. One further point here is the extreme demographic flux over this 
period. In 1948, Jews were outnumbered by Arabs in Palestine by two to one, but with rapid 
Jewish emigration to Palestine this looked as if it would equalise or even create a Jewish 
majority.78 Part of Magnes’ proposal was the stabilisation of the Jewish-Arab population in 
Palestine, thus, in Arendt’s terms, avoiding the majority-minority problem within Palestine. 
The insurmountable Jewish-Arab demographic imbalance in the wider region, could from 
here be resolved, Arendt evidently hoped, through the creation of broader federations.  
What is particularly important is that it was the Atlantic City Conference of 1944, 
rather than the Biltmore Conference of 1942, that Arendt marks out as the decisive move in 
Zionism towards irredeemable nationalism. It was thus not until 1944 that Arendt broke with 
Zionism, two years after Magnes’ rejection of the movement. From 1942 to 1944, Arendt is 
writing as a critical, but ultimately loyal, supporter of the Zionist movement, after that, she is 
not. The style of her earlier criticisms of Magnes are telling, for example, she blames Magnes 
(in large part) for a “crisis of Zionism,” by undermining the only possible movement that 
could unify the Jews as a people.79 After 1944, her opinion of Zionism was shattered, as what 
she believed to be a fundamentally unpolitical ideology became dominant, which was both 
chillingly nationalistic and prejudiced against the Arabs. Her position became that of a 
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Zionist outsider, and thus she finds an ally in Magnes, another outsider, and “the leader of the 
only group that is still willing to pursue an understanding with the Arabs.”80 
This whole approach looks impossibly idealistic in retrospect – as indeed, it did then. 
Hostility between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East had been growing since the 1920s, due 
to growing violent nationalism on both sides, making Arab-Jewish cooperation unlikely. 
Even Arendt only believed her suggestions had an outside chance of implementation. 
However, she was certain the alternative would be disastrous for at least one of the two 
Palestinian peoples. Only “the political implementation and guarantee of permanent 
cooperation, and not national sovereignty, offers a solution in which the true national 
interests of both peoples might be safeguarded,” she wrote.81  
While Arendt’s solution may have looked implausible, her analysis was prescient. She 
recognised the intensity of the Jewish-Arab conflict, and its roots in the developing national 
identities of both peoples. Generally, the dominant Zionist narratives of the time failed to 
recognise Arab national identities, an omission which in retrospect appears striking. Arendt 
also saw that the threat posed by the wider Arab region to Israel, if constituted as a militant 
nation-state (and thus a potential threat) could only be countered by a quasi-imperial 
benefactor, a major power who would throw its military weight behind the young state.  
Arendt had not only abandoned mainstream Zionism by this point, but in response to 
the post-war Jewish political context, rather than calling upon Jews to fight, believed it 
imperative they negotiate for peace. The creation of Israel had resulted in the recognition of 
the Jewish people as an independent nation, while the Holocaust had shocked Jews out of 
their complacency towards antisemitism, leading to a revival of Jewish self-identification. 
Yet Arendt also saw danger in the changing character of the Jewish people, particularly those 
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in Palestine. Their new found political confidence had turned them from assimilationists into 
nationalists, with all the problems that posed.  
 
The result [of the war] has been an amazing and rapid change in what we call national 
character. After two thousand years of “Galuth mentality,” the Jewish people have 
suddenly ceased to believe in survival as an ultimate good in itself and have gone over 
in a few years to the opposite extreme. Now Jews believe in fighting at any price and 
feel that “going down” is a very sensible method of politics.82 
 
With these changes, the political innovation of the Kibbutzim movement, had been 
overwhelmed by the success of national parties in Israel, and the “growth of totalitarian 
methods…silently tolerated and secretly applauded.”83 Arendt was not alone in this harsh 
criticism, and with other prominent Jewish immigrants, including Einstein and Sydney Hook, 
wrote a letter to the New York Times in 1948 criticising the “reign of terror” of Irgun and the 
Stern Gang, two of the most extreme Revisionist groups in Israel.84  
Arendt considered herself to be dealing with a very different problem now: not the 
question of how Jews reify their identity without the nation state, but how Jews can maintain 
their political identity in a national context while rejecting nationalist ideology. She still, 
however, employed the concepts developed over the previous two decades. Her critique of 
nationalism as an assumption of “natural substance” and inequality was transferred from a 
critique of German political culture to a critique of the Israeli position towards their 
neighbours. Their attitude, Arendt argues, is one of “plain racist chauvinism,” whose division 
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of Jews from other peoples, who are therefore classed as enemies “does not differ from other 
master-race theories.”85 Hence, she concludes, “any interpretation of politics oriented to such 
‘principles’ is hopelessly out of touch with the realities of this world. Nevertheless it is a fact 
that such attitudes tacitly or explicitly permeate the general atmosphere of Jewry; and 
therefore Jewish leaders can threaten mass suicide to the applause of their audience.”86  
The Origins of Totalitarianism marks the end of Arendt’s Jewish focus. Published in 
1951, the book brought together her thought on Jewish politics and nationalism with Western 
politics more broadly, to seek out the causes of totalitarianism. But Arendt had become 
deeply disillusioned by the events surrounding Israel’s birth and firmly opposed to what she 
considered its doomed political system. With the death of Magnes in late 1948, her last hopes 
for Israel died.  “The fact is,” she wrote, “nobody in the Jewish people could succeed 
Magnes. This is the measure of his greatness; it is, by the same token, the measure of our 
failure.” 87 But this is not a rejection of Israel itself, nor Zionism in a broad sense. Arendt’s 
refusal to write on Jewish politics was motivated by the opposite emotion. She remained 
involved in Jewish committees, donated to Jewish charitable organisations, and regularly 
visited Israel. She often discussed Israel privately. Why the public silence? In one letter, from 
1953, she explains. “The whole business is absolutely nauseating. I decided that I do not want 
to have anything to do with Jewish politics any longer – not even in the way of protesting. All 
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that seem to me to involve is that one is willing and prepared to fight it out in public. And this 
is what I am not prepared to do.”88  
She was not prepared to fight it out in public because she continued to support Israel, 
even while she rejected its leadership and the nationalist principles she believed Israel had 
embraced, in contrast to the cosmopolitan, plural and federal principles of her own Zionist 
ideal. Israel had become political fact, and could not be reversed without terrible 
consequences. Arendt may have rejected Herzl’s Israel, but once realised, she refused to turn 
on it. Yet she saw no way out of the deepening political antagonisms that cleaved the region; 
she no longer believed peace was possible. In another letter she wrote: “There are a few 
things one could do, and even these have no great chance of success. Among them are equal 
rights for all Arabs in Israel…and the restitution of land without conditions. But nothing of 
this will happen…The whole people has become fanatical.”89 
Despite Arendt’s refusal to write on Jewish politics – with the important exception of 
Eichmann in Jerusalem a decade later, which she claimed was merely a trial report of brute 
facts – her occasional comments on her earlier work show she continued to identify with the 
arguments offered in her Jewish writings.  In 1961 she responded to a request for a sequel to 
her 1945 article Zionism Reconsidered, by simply replying that she still adhered to the ideas 
within that article, and so had nothing to add.90 
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VIII 
 
Arendt’s early writings consistently reject assimilationism and nationalism, focusing 
increasingly on the latter as political conditions and Zionist political ideology evolved over 
time. Her development of a positive, non-nationalist concept of a nation emerged from this 
dual critique, and although initially closely connected to Jewish politics, in particular the now 
largely lost Zionist tradition of Lazare, Arendt came to apply its principles to politics more 
widely. The criticism of inconsistency in Arendt’s early work can be explained with reference 
to the historical and political context, while the clarity of this vision in Arendt’s 
correspondence with Magnes, opposes claims of political incoherency in her pre-Origins 
work. Arendt’s ideal, a binational Palestine within a regional federation, portrays the 
potential for the realisation of this concept.  
To recapitulate, a people, in Arendt’s terms, must seek to avoid the twin evils of 
assimilation and nationalism, and strike a balance between inner and outer, change and 
tradition. Dogmatic ideology, whether the belief that there is no difference between peoples, 
or the belief that all peoples are essentially different, rejects the reality of human difference 
and changeability. Arendt’s rejection of assimilation began with her assessment in Rahel, that 
while assimilation requires the rejection of a common past, individuals depend on this for the 
interconnected purposes of individual identity as well as group identity. In a world formed of 
different political communities, the undermining of their shared world was disastrous for 
Jews for psychological, social, and political reasons. Meanwhile, growing nationalism 
fostered by individualisation, together with the growth of powerful state systems, resulted in 
the negation of assimilation: the ideology of natural differences between peoples. This, 
equally at odds with the reality of a globalising world, would bring disaster to all peoples, a 
process Arendt set out in Origins. Western nationalisms of the late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth century, breeding contempt for foreign peoples by brutal imperial colonisation, 
fostered the acceptance of brute force as politics, and also engendered race-thinking, 
preparing the ground for the breakdown of traditional politics, and thus totalitarianism. Such 
ideologies were applied domestically, first to “alien” peoples (i.e. Jews), but ultimately, 
Arendt argued, this mode of thinking about politics would lead to the repression of all 
peoples, if unopposed. 
In Arendt’s alternative conception of a nation, a shared past is the beginning of 
identity for individuals within that tradition, and from this, the loose, changing basis of 
national identity. The global interconnectedness of those traditions constrains political 
possibilities, but is not definitive. Instead, peoples are defined through the actions of people 
within that tradition, as well as the interaction and opposition of people and peoples from 
different traditions. Leaving room for individual and national difference, Arendt’s definition 
of a people is, crucially, based upon the assumption of group and individual differences. 
There is no definitive centre, rather, it is suggestive of the “web of interactions” Arendt later 
defined as the political. Importantly, free action is prized above perfectibility or 
universalisation, leaving individual action as the true constituent power.  
Arendt’s binational, federated Israel-Palestine plan maps onto this theoretical 
structure, bringing two separate communities into a relationship of mutual interest, while 
maintaining their distinguishing features and independence. Spanning out, this binational 
system underpins a wider regional federation. The rejection of sovereignty and clear 
territorial lines – the basis of the modern state – could form, Arendt believed, a political 
structure on which to build peace, by recognising and institutionalising difference on a basis 
of equality. A pluralistic structure, recognising the constitutive power of the people’s action 
springing from a basis of traditional values, as well as the necessity of integration with the 
outside world, mirrored her understanding of a people. That Arendt believed there was a 
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chance of this happening displays the belief she had in the capacity of men to live together 
cooperatively and share a world, and the power of institutional structure in bringing this 
about. So she placed her faith in a new constitutional form which she believed could embody 
Israeli political reality in a peaceful manner, in a world where she believed the nation state 
had little prospect of long-term success.  
While central aspects of Arendt’s early thought certainly developed from her Zionist 
engagement, there are of course other important early influences. Whilst too numerous to 
fully reconstruct here, certain of these should be noted. Her two teachers, Heidegger and 
Jaspers, were formative in crucial respects, not least in Arendt’s adoption of their 
phenomenological methodology. From Heidegger, Canovan argues, Arendt learnt “not so 
much a doctrine as the activity of thinking itself.”91 From Jaspers, however, Arendt drew key 
elements of her theory relating to the importance of communication and community in 
establishing identity, a theme also evident through Rahel and Arendt’s idea of a people. But 
where Jaspers, before the war, was more interested in describing Existenz from the 
perspective of the self, Arendt’s work, after Rahel, was always concerned with human 
pluralities – with politics. As Young-Bruehl points out, Jaspers also had aspects to his early 
thought that Arendt was unwilling to accept. “Jaspers was challenged by Hannah Arendt’s 
refusal to accept what he called in Weberian language ‘the German essence.’”92 Jaspers was 
important to Arendt’s philosophical development, and his influence continued to play a role 
through Arendt’s political work, but her interest in politics came about through her 
engagement with Jewish issues. 
Arendt’s husband Heinrich Blucher, however, is another early political influence. 
Blucher had been involved in the Sparticist uprising in Berlin in 1919, and remained 
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committed to left-wing revolutionary ideology for some time after he met Arendt. From 
Blucher, one might imagine some of the more “revolutionary” aspects of Arendt’s thought 
were inspired, as well as her more internationalist approach. However, Arendt never adopted 
Blucher’s particular political sympathies, and since Blucher’s political thought was not 
written down in any systematised manner it is extremely difficult to map the precise nature of 
his influence on her thought. Contrasted with Arendt’s extensive commentary on Zionism of 
various types, Blucher’s influence must of necessity remain relatively obscure.  
William Selinger and Gil Rubin also show in recent articles that Arendt’s federalism 
was part of a broader conversation occurring in the 1940s.93 Selinger and Rubin depict a 
lively federal debate in the international arena, and Rubin interestingly observes that this 
debate influenced the Zionist movement itself, as well as Arendt, although the disparity 
between them shows the lack of consensus around federalist ideas. 
Selinger identifies an “internationalist” trend in Origins, and offers a compelling 
depiction of how contemporary European debates on federalism influenced Arendt’s work.94 
But there is no real conflict between the European and Jewish influences on Arendt’s work – 
the two facets of Arendt’s background are both foundational to her thought. Yet while 
Arendt’s European-Jewish heritage cannot be divided, it was her concern with specifically 
Jewish politics which first brought her into contact with politics and maintained her interest 
for many years. Her experience of the German intellectual community’s mute acceptance (or 
support, in Heidegger’s case) of Hitler led her, she later explained, to leave Germany 
“dominated by the idea…: Never again! I shall never again get involved in any kind of 
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intellectual business. I want nothing to do with that lot.”95 Yet Arendt’s involvement with 
Youth Aliyah in Paris, her work for Aufbau in New York, and perhaps most profoundly, her 
friendship with Magnes inspired her with some hope. “Politics in our century is almost a 
business of despair,” Arendt wrote to Magnes. “I have always been tempted to run away from 
it. I wanted you to know that your example prevented me from despairing and will prevent 
me for many years to come.”96 Nor should it be forgotten how long Arendt spent working on 
Zionism and Jewish politics. For half her adult life (by 1951, Arendt was 45), it was her 
dominant intellectual preoccupation. And although Arendt’s early written output is less 
voluminous, it should not be taken any less seriously than her later work.  
 
IX 
 
I will conclude by outlining how these early Jewish concepts influenced the development of 
her later thought, using Arendt’s 1963 On Revolution, to outline the connections between her 
concept of a Jewish people, and her later, more universalised idea of a political people. This 
is prefaced with the observation that there are important differences between Arendt’s pre- 
and post-Origins writings: themes and questions absent from one or the other, and the 
evolution of ideas in the later writings which are undeveloped earlier on. Aside from the shift 
from Jewish to “Western” politics already discussed, I will here note two ideas of particular 
importance to On Revolution, and her later work more broadly (but not the earlier): her 
republicanism and her notion of “the social.” A sympathy with republicanism can be 
discerned in Origins, when Arendt writes that the only counter to the Dreyfus Affair was 
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“that Republican view of communal life which asserts that…by infringing on the rights of 
one you infringe on the rights of all.”97 Yet not until the 1950s would she begin to explicitly 
develop these ideas, influenced by her long-standing interest in Roman political thought. In 
On Revolution she outlines her idea of republicanism through a comparison between early 
American republicanism, which she favours, and the corrupted republicanism of the French 
Revolution. Also central to On Revolution, the complex idea of “the social” is absent from 
Arendt’s Jewish writings. In Rahel and Origins the term is used in a largely conventional 
manner, substantially different to the idea detailed in The Human Condition. There “the 
social” was portrayed as a specifically modern problem, whereby the traditionally separate 
public and private spheres are confused with one another, leading to the breakdown of the 
boundary and thus the sphere of the public-political itself.  
But ideas from Arendt’s early work do prepare the groundwork for these concepts, 
and moreover, several central concepts drawn from her understanding of “the people” can be 
seen in On Revolution. Arendt compares two communities: the American people and the 
French “multitudes.” Early Americans, she wrote, developed an understanding of politics, 
and a mode of political practice, sharply contrasting with European sovereign systems. They 
understood the nature of politics as power, she argued, the idea that the active involvement of 
citizens was essential; that the free and equal engagement of citizens in a public sphere 
created politics. This was institutionalised in township councils, where citizens engaged in 
the public sphere through agonic discourse and the resultant emergence of shared meaning 
and action. This understanding of political power as constituted in the space between citizens, 
combined with the idea of authority in the constitutional foundation, was fundamental to the 
success of the Revolution, Arendt writes.  
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The word “people” retained for [the American founders] the meaning of manyness, of 
the endless variety of a multitude whose majesty resided in its very plurality…they 
knew that the public realm in a republic was constituted by an exchange of opinion 
between equals, and that this realm would simply disappear at the very moment an 
exchange became superfluous because all equals happened to be of the same 
opinion.98  
 
For Arendt, America represents a model of what politics should be. By contrast, the 
political practice that emerged from the French Revolution resulted in violent chaos, and 
represents not simply political failure, but an example of an anti-political system. The French, 
Arendt writes, while motivated by the same desire for liberation as the Americans, failed to 
grasp the essence of politics as power. The “social question” of poverty meant biological 
need dominated - the people’s hunger dictated their demands – and the fragile but politically 
essential public space of discourse, was eroded, and thus, politics itself. The French 
“multitude” was connected only in its overwhelming poverty, and the notion of the general 
will became the means by which the people were understood to be involved in politics. When 
the multitude were believed to be one unified mind, no discourse could be possible, and 
instead ideological aspirations of natural progress and the stripping away of political artifice 
and hypocrisy, through liberation from the ancient regime, came to be seen as paramount. 
Fundamentally destructive of politics, this ideology also proved to be fundamentally 
destructive of men, through the violence it demanded in order to shape the world according to 
its own dictates.     
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While this story is conceptually mapped onto Arendt’s tripartite division of the vita 
activa from The Human Condition, there are multiple aspects here, specifically pertaining to 
the division of the American people and the French multitude, which mirror the distinction 
between the Jewish people and the Jewish nation. For Arendt, writing in the 1940s, the 
constituent power of the Jewish people must be the people themselves, not an elite Jewish 
leadership. While this idea is common to French and American revolutionary thinking, 
Arendt’s appeal in her binational plan, to localised, council or kibbutz-style communal action 
involving large numbers of citizens, evokes a notion of constituent power which is in concept 
and practice close to the American system, and in opposition to the French appeal to an 
ideological abstraction of the people through the general will, and the practice of 
representative leadership. The notion of “action” in Arendt’s later work, may therefore be 
found in embryonic form within Arendt’s Jewish writings, themselves influenced by Jaspers’ 
existenzphilosophie, and an emphasis on the potential for individual spontaneity and 
creativity. 
The distinction between both the French and American communities, and the Jewish 
people and Jewish nation, can be summarised in terms of plurality. Political action, as Arendt 
describes it, can only be enacted in a condition of plurality: whereby individuals are 
recognised as both politically equal and distinct. This enables genuine discourse to take 
place, and thus is a condition of politics itself. Nationalism rejects equality, while 
assimilationism rejects difference. Yet if both Jews and Arabs would accept a political system 
which recognised both peoples as equal, but different – the binational system – Israel had a 
future, she believed. One important difference is that Arendt’s argument for binationalism 
demands plurality on the level of peoples, not individuals, while the American example 
demanded individual plurality, at least for the minority eligible for citizenship. Yet the 
principle, I argue, is the same, and this similarity is visible in Arendt’s Palestinian 
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constitutional settlement based upon councils. As Bernstein writes, Arendt’s emphasis on the 
need for an Arab population in Palestine involves “a contest of a plurality of perspectives that 
are publicly displayed and tested in public spaces.”99 Plurality involves a notion of anti-
foundationalism which is as important to Arendt’s early writings, in her rejection of 
nationalism or ideological thinking, as her later thought, where it is a constant. In both cases, 
the rejection of objective truth or absolutes in politics should be connected to the need for 
plurality in politics, on a conceptual, individual, and national level. The biological 
determinacy Arendt rejects in terms of nationalism, emerges in her later rejection of 
sovereignty as rule.   
The last connection I will make relates to the interaction between individual freedom 
and the political that features heavily in On Revolution and Arendt’s work generally. For 
Arendt, the Jew lost something of her personhood when she rejected her Jewishness in order 
to assimilate. The problem was that Jews were simply not accepted as “ordinary” by those 
they tried to assimilate with. It is not enough to demand to become a member of a particular 
people if you are not accepted as equal. Such an individual is literally without a people – 
having rejected one tradition, and been rejected by another. She is missing something which, 
as Arendt depicts in Rahel, is of the utmost importance to one’s sense of self. Although it is 
not made explicit in Rahel, I suggest that what is missing is the freedom to take part in 
political practice, that is, the possibility of engaging in genuinely free discourse with others in 
a community, thereby fully disclosing one’s identity and enacting one’s agency. Underlying 
both the “joy” of political action that Arendt writes about in On Revolution, and the despair 
of the assimilated “parvenu” she writes about in her Jewish writings, is the idea that 
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individual agency is inherently connected to political community, and recognition of and by a 
community. 
The notion of “the people,” therefore, as distinct from “the nation,” and developed 
through a lengthy engagement with Zionism and Jewish politics, contains in essence several 
of the most important ideas which Arendt later develops, including the notions of action and 
plurality; the connection between individual agency and identity and group identity; and an 
appeal to anti-foundationalism. As such, Arendt’s Jewish writings may profitably be drawn 
upon for a deeper understanding of her concept of the political and its origins.  
